There is a huge literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade levels. One very strong result of that literature is that uncertainty should not matter, as long as well developed forward markets exist. The empirical implications of this result, however, are hard to find in the data. We model terms of trade uncertainty in a small open economy with uncertainty stemming from abroad and derive the equilibrium demand for forward contracts. It turns out that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an actuarially fair price, thus rendering both the full-hedge theorem and the separation theorem of the aforementioned literature obsolete. Using real world data for Germany we calibrate our model. We find that in equilibrium risk averse agents will buy forward cover only for nvestment reasons. The amount of forwards purchased is around 20% of equilibrium imports. This is broadly in accordance with empirical observed ratios. JEL-Classification: F00, F30, G10
Introduction

1
International trade in goods is characterized by uncertainty. Common sense and economic theory suggest that exporters, importers and households should try to hedge against this uncertainty. Natural candidates for hedging instruments are future and forward contracts. In fact, Ethier (1973) introduced the separation theorem and the full hedge theorem under exchange rate uncertainty, showing that demand for forward contracts perfectly compensates uncertainty. Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (1985) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) additionally discussed price level uncertainty, obtaining the same results. Recently this strong result has been subject to some qualifications. Viaene and Zilcha (1998) for example, consider additionally output and cost uncertainty and find that under this setup full-double hedge and separation fail to hold. Adam-Müller (2000) introduces inflation risk which cannot be hedged away and finds that full-hedge and separation break down if the two sources of risk in the model are not statistically independent. Market structure issues have been addressed as well, examples are Eldor and Zilcha (1987) and Broll and Zilcha (1992) .
The empirical literature, though spares, does not support the strong theoretical predictions of the early literature. As Carse, Williamson and Wood (1980) and others have shown, only roughly one-third of the value of international trade is covered by forward contracts. Even equity flows are only poorly hedged. According to Hau and Rey (2003) only 8% of US equity holdings abroad are hedged against exchange rate risks. Furthermore, there exists a lively debate in the empirical literature as to whether exchange rate volatility depresses trade levels or not. This debate is related to the issue of demand for forwards in that often the argument is made that as long as agents have access to well developed forward markets, the uncertainty should not matter. Strikingly, the evidence is rather mixed and seems to be independent of the existence of well developed forward markets (see Coté (1994) for a survey on the empirical evidence and Wei (1998) for a discussion of the underlying causes). This paper reconciles empirical findings with theoretical considerations.
We build an infinite horizon small open economy model where one good is domestically produced with capital and labour, another good is imported.
Both goods are consumed. Capital is accumulated and risk averse households hedge optimally against terms of trade uncertainty.
2 One forward contract allows (and obliges) them to buy one import good in the next period at a fixed pricep Y .
We first study the determinants of demand for forwards. We show that the exogenous internationally given forward pricep Y is the crucial determinant of demand for forwards. If this price equals the expected price of the import good, households do not want to buy any forwards. (They would actually want to sell forwards.) If this price equals the price at which risk neutral households would be indifferent, risk averse households demand a positive amount of forward contract.
The reason for the fact that risk averse households want to sell forwards at actuarially fair prices lies in the concavity of their utility function in con-2 In contrast to the majority of the literature on that topic households demand forwards, not firms. This, however, simply follows from the general equlibrium setup we use. Firms are owned by the households, who look "through" them. A similar argument is made in Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998, pp. 18 ).
sumption levels. With consumption levels optimally chosen ex-post, indirect utility functions of individuals exhibit convexity in prices, though still concavity in expenditure. As expenditure is a function of prices as well, overall the indirect utility function exhibits convexity in prices and households are actually (price-) risk lovers. Positive demand therefore requires a price that is sufficiently low, e.g. the price offered by risk neutral households. Intuitively we could think of the risk averse households as not willing to commit themselves to a consumption decision, when faced with price uncertainty. They do not want to give away the option to adjust their consumption bundles.
We then calibrate the model by using realistic and reasonable parameter values. We find that between 10 and 20% of international trade is covered by forward contracts. The low ratios cited in the empirical literature are therefore not surprising and may reflect the curvature of utility functions of utility maximizing households. Partial equilibrium setups or setups focusing on risk neutral firms should therefore be extended to take this aspect into consideration.
We are not the first that find that full-hedge theorem and separation theorem does not hold. As argued above there is a substantial literature that finds that these two theorems will not hold as soon as certain conditions, i.e. independence of the underlying sources of uncertainty, are violated. Our result, however, is derived in a completely different manner. The crucial point is the decision structure of our agents. The standard approach assumes that all decisions are made before the resolution of uncertainty. In contrast we employ an alternative decision rule. In the first period, still before resolution of uncertainty, the agents decide upon their level of hedging and in the second, after the uncertainty is resolved, the agents actually make their consumption decision. Following this approach, agents will never be able to eliminate 4 uncertainty from their budgets and hence are faced with a trade-off. Using this setup and considering normal conditions, i.e. actuarially fair insurance, risk averse agents will never buy forward cover.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, section 3 presents the solutions of the model and the following section discusses the properties of the equilibrium and makes some qualitative statements of the comparative static behavior of the system using a numerical calibration of the model. A brief discourse to options as a mean of comparison ends the theoretical discussion of the model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Technologies
We study a small open economy that produces one good X that is internationally traded. It imports a foreign consumption good Y which is not domestically produced. Domestic production requires capital K and labour L, which are non-tradable,
Time is discrete and variables are indexed by t. The production function X (.) has the standard neoclassical properties. Firms produce under perfect competition and factor rewards w 
The number of units of the import good to be exchanged for one unit of the export good, i.e. international terms of trade p X t /p Y t at a point in time t are exogenously given to the economy and unknown in t − 1. The probability distribution f ¡ p
Households
The horizon of the economy is infinite. Agents in this economy live for two periods. They work in the first period and consume in the second period of their life. Consumption in the second period comprises both the domestically produced good and the foreign good.
Preferences and budget constraints
Let their utility function be given by
where u (C X , C Y ) is some homothetic utility function and v (.) determines the degree of risk aversion. For illustrating purposes, we will later use
Note that the utility function (5) displays risk aversion towards the consumption levels. Risk aversion in total consumption expenditure is given for 0 < σ < 1, risk neutrality in consumption expenditure would be represented by σ = 1.
A household's first period budget constraint equates labor income with savings and expenditure for financial contracts D t ,
Savings are used to buy capital goods s t /p X . There is the implicit assumption of a market in which today's old, being the owners of the capital stock sell it to today's young in exchange for consumption good X, which in turn constitutes the wage of today's young. The sum over all individual savings equal the current capital stock (i.e. after depreciation) plus additional aggregate investment (which might be negative)
In the second period, households use all of their wealth and other income for financing consumption expenditure e t+1 . End of second period wealth 
where we defined
and savings s t were replaced by using the first period budget constraint (7).
The second period budget constraint (9) nicely shows that payoffs ¡ p This budget constraint also shows that households cannot insure fully against terms of trade risk. Forward contracts refer to a certain amount of goods that can be purchased at this fixed pricep Y . As the actual amount of goods consumed depends on the realization p Y t+1 of the price, some uncertainty always remains. This is the crucial departure of our model from the classic setups in the hedging literature Ethier (1973, pp. 496) and Benninga et al. (1985, pp. 540 ). There, firms decide today in t how much they will produce tomorrow in t + 1. This allows them to fully insure against uncertainty in the price of their output good. The well-known separation theorem of no uncertainty after hedging results. If our agents knew how much they will consume tomorrow, full hedging would be possible as well. They will never know, however, as price uncertainty has an income effect as well.
A no-bankruptcy constraint
In order to avoid insolvency on parts of the agents in our model, we have to introduce a no-bankruptcy constraint. Point of departure is the expenditure equation (9). It goes without saying that a negative expenditure is not possible, hence we argue that the worst that can happen to the budget of our agents is:
Solving for D t yields
Regarding our forward, the worst that can happen is p Y t+1 = 0. Prudence thus demands that the amount of D t an agent is allowed to purchase shall never be any greater than:
This condition makes intuitively sense: the greater the contracted p Y , the smaller the amount of forwards the agents are allowed to buy. Similar lines of reasoning hold for the other variables.
9 3 Solving the model
The maximization problem of households
The maximization problem of households consists in choosing the amount D t of forward contracts and optimal consumption levels C X and C Y such that expected utility Ev (u (C X , C Y )) is maximized, given the budget constraint
Conceptually, maximization can be subdivided into two steps. The second step consists in allocating consumption expenditure to goods X and Y, taking consumption expenditure as given. This second sub-problem is solved after realization of terms of trade. It is therefore a choice under certainty. The
Cobb-Douglas specification (5) would imply
These equations hold at each point in time and determine consumption levels after uncertainty has been resolved.
The first step consists in choosing the optimal amount D t of forward contracts by solving
where
¢¢ is utility where consumption levels in the homothetic utility function u (C X , C Y ) have been replaced by optimal consumption levels. Utility u (C X , C Y ) can then be written as expenditure divided by the price index. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the price index reads
where Φ is a constant. Expenditure is given by (9).
This two-step solution to our maximization problem is made possible by assuming that consumption takes place only when agents are old. If consumption were to take place in both periods, the consumption choice in the first period would be linked to the saving decision. The system that would have to be analyzed would be more complicated (as an intertemporal consumption rule would have to be added).
The solution to this problem is then given by
This first should increase holdings of D t . However, given positive costs to obtain forward cover, i.e. χ > 0, increasing D t will increase r t , hence opportunity costs will rise as well, up to a point where marginal utility will fall in D t .Hence the optimal amount of D t is such that the positive and the negative components of the sum simply cancel out.
Reduced form
The reduced form of the model consists of two equations. The capital stock in the next period is given by savings today times the number L of individuals and divided by the price of one unit of capital and is given by (8) . With the first-period budget constraint (7) giving individual savings, we obtain
where the wage rate was replaced by its value marginal product (2) .
The amount of forward contracts is determined by the first order condition (15). When consuming, the old consume the current capital stock, interest payments on the current capital stock plus income (or losses) from forward contracts. Expenditure in (15) therefore equals
which formally follows from the budget constraint (9) where nominal wages w t were replaced according to (2).
Equations (15) and (16), given (17), determine the two variables K t and
Equation (16) determining the evolution of capital shows that next periods capital is known in t. By contrast, expenditure (17) is uncertain when some forward contracts are signed. This makes consumption levels of both goods and exports and imports uncertain. If no forward contracts are signed (D = 0), expenditure is deterministic, consumption of good X would be deterministic but consumption of good Y would be stochastic.
Steady-state
In the steady state, the capital stock is the same in each period. Variables that are constant are printed without a time subscript. All stochastic variables are denoted by a tilde (~).The capital stock is then determined by
and is therefore a deterministic variable. Domestic production (1) is then
remains stochastic and D follows implicitely from (15)
with (19) .
Equilibrium properties
The two reduced form equations yield an unique equilibrium, if they cross once in R ++ . Equation (16) describing the evolvement of the capital stock is a non-linear first order difference equation. Even though it is not possible to derive an analytical solution, the properties of this type of schedule are well 13 understood 5 . The optimal amount of D to be purchased is given by (15).
In principle this equation can be understood as an integral. Nevertheless it is not possible to analytically derive the shape of this schedule, for the sign of the derivative dEv dK remains ambiguous. It is, however, possible to analytically determine whether or not the agents are willing to hold forwards and hence we turn to this issue first. To determine the equilibrium points we have to resort to numerical methods. This will constitute the second part of our equilibrium discussion. In the last section we introduce and discuss an option contract. By deriving several equilibrium properties of this type of contract the properties of the forwards become more clear also.
The equilibrium demand for forwards
We now present three important results with respect to the existence of interior solutions, i.e. a positive demand for D t.
Theorem 1 Risk averse agents will not buy forward cover at fair prices, i.e.
This result is illustrated in the following figure: -1 -0. Viaene and Zilcha (1998) and Adam-Müller (2000) . 9 There are a few papers that discuss the theoretical possibility of a different timing structure, an example being Perée and Steinherr (1989) . We are, however, not aware of any work that explicitely models this.
Theorem 2 Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for sufficiently
10
Note that this result follows from the first theorem, in which we relied on the negativity of the covariance term. Further this condition is implied by utility maximization of the agents. One possible interpretation would be that if p Y is lower than the expected value of the price uncertainty in period two, the average return of a forward position is positive. Thus the agent will be compensated for giving up their possibility to adjust their consumption bundle according to the price realizations in the next period. Hence the agents are willing to hold a forward position. .
, i.e. the price risk neutral households would offer, risk averse agents will buy forward contracts.
11
To illustrate the third result we resort again to the figure above. Clearly, since the exponent c = σ (1 − α) is smaller for risk averse agents than for risk neutral ones and the derivative dξ dc is negative, a decrease in c -thus moving from risk neutrality to risk aversion -increases the slope of the function at the intersection with the vertical axis. As we are moving from a point where this slope is zero, we in effect move the whole function to the right.
Note that these results may be somewhat surprising, given the "fullhedge theorem" we normally encounter in the literature (see Ethier (1973) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) for example). The reason for this is that our model differs from the usual models in the way that agents always will have uncertainty through the price-index channel, whereas in the former models there is the possibility to avoid all uncertainty, for agents completely decide 10 See appendix 6.1 for the proof. 11 See appendix 6.1 for the proof.
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upon their plans in period one. 12 Risk averse agents do not want to lose the ability to adjust to price shocks in the next period, whereas risk neutral agents are indifferent towards this opportunity. This is the reason why risk neutral households would be willing to offer forward contracts.
The convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to the prices is illustrated in the figure below. 12 There is one notable exeption. Clark (1973, Section II, pp.308 ) deals with the case where exporters cannot fully hedge away the exchange rate risk, even though there are perfect forward markets. His reason, however, is a different one, for he considers the effects of limited maturities in that markets.
Another interesting point here is the behavior of the risk neutral agents.
By offering forwards at a more than actuarially fair rate, they, on average, incur losses with this asset. Their compensation, on the other hand, is the augmented capital stock and its returns.
Calibrating the model
In this section we will briefly present some numerical solutions of the model. As a first step we have to specify the production technology. We will use a Cobb-Douglas form:
Equation (16) relies on three exogenously given parameters. These are L, χ and β. P X is the numeraire and thus can be set one. Depreciation is assumed to be zero, hence we have δ = 0 and the scale parameter for the technology, S, is set to one. Now χ represents in some way the costs of the forward cover, even though, strictly speaking, χ is the market price of the forward contract. This two concepts are in fact quite different. In reality the market price of the forward cover is quite small, whereas the real costs of obtaining forward cover may very well be substantial. 13 This leaves some room for determining the value of χ and thus we will set this value arbitrarily, but close to zero. In our calibration we used 1 100
. The size of the population is just a scale parameter and therefore no further elaboration is necessary. We set L = 100. The beta parameter of our production function reflects relative shares of capital (and, by our specification also labour) and is commonly found e.g. Maddison (1987, p. 658 ) and thus in this context assumed to be around 0.3.
The other reduced form equation comes with three parameters to specify as well. These are p Y , α and the underlying distribution. The p Y is determined by the price at which risk neutral individuals would offer the forwards, i.e.
Equation (21) 
A numerical solution
We now present a simulation result for a small country. Under lognormal distributed price uncertainty, using the parameter specification we presented above, we found that the economy will buy a total amount of 2.03 units of forward contracts, given the price risk neutral agents would offer. The capital stock and thus GDP of the economy can be calculated and using the mean on the distribution as the realization of the price in period two, the economy will import 10.2 units of good Y . This means, that the forward cover to import ratio is in this case approximately 20%. This is in accordance to surveys on 14 The Black-Scholes formula relies on lognormality of prices. Even in international macro this assumption is often used, see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) . 15 For this purpose we made use of R and the function fitdistr which is icluded in the MASS package. 16 The programme code is available from the authors upon request.
the topic. For example Carse et al. (1980) found that firms that import or export and thus face terms of trade risk, only cover between 15-30% of their open positions.
Some caveats are in order here. First, the actual terms of trade variance may well be underestimated with our proxy used. If this is true, the calculated amount of forwards is too high as well. Second, the costs of forwards we used are to some degree arbitrary. They are, however, close to the actual transaction fees charged by banks but would not incorporate such items as information costs and fixed costs for setting up the appropriate institutions, letting alone deliberation costs. To the extent to which the actual costs are higher, our result overestimates the amount of forwards purchased. Lastly there is the issue of the degree if risk aversion with respect to wealth. In the literature there is no consensus on that parameter. We choose to set this
, which is a conservative choice in the sense that a broad range of publications support this choice. It also turns out that this particular parameter is the least influential in altering our results.
The aformentioned qualifictations notwithstanding, this numerical exercise recaps our analytical results and shows that the model is able to fit the actual data for reasonable parameter values.
Comparative statics
There are a couple of interesting questions arising when considering changing the parameters. We begin with the terms of trade variance. If there is an exogenously induced increase in the variance of the foreign price we observe a fall in the demand for forwards. At our calculated equilibrium point we observe a decrease of 4.7% in demand for forwards if we increase the variance by 1%. This is accordance with the intuition for our results. Risk averse agents are not willing to give up the possibility to adjust themselves to a terms of trade shock. The greater the likelihood of a terms of trade shock, the more they have to be compensated for holding forward contracts.
Next consider the costs of the forwards. If costs decrease, demand will increase. At the point of our interior solution a 1% decrease in the costs would induce a 16% rise in the demand for forward contracts.
Lastly we look at the degree of risk aversion. A society which is more risk averse than another will demand less forward cover than the less risk averse society. A 1% increase of the degree of risk aversion, i.e. a 1% fall in σ, reduces demand for forwards by 0.4%. The comparative static result for an increase in the variance is covered in the picture below: in the degree of risk aversion will ceteris paribus decrease the demand for forward cover by shifting the schedule implied by (15) downwards. Note that in the case of changing costs, the capital schedule will also shift.
Options
In order to give additional insights into the workings of our model, we will in this section examine what the optimal hedging behavior would be if the 22 agents could buy options instead of forward contracts to insure against the uncertainty regarding the price of the foreign good. An (call) option, as opposed to a forward contract, does not oblige to buy the underlying asset (or commodity), instead the buyer can choose whether or not he will exercise his option. If we are to keep our notation we can extend our model very easily to model an option instead of a forward contract, by observing that in the event
the buyer of that option would simply not exercise it. To model options we only have to change the expenditure equation:
Where D t now denotes now the amount of options instead of forward contracts, the strike price being p Y . Hence by buying one option for the price χ an agent is entitled to buy one unit of good Y in the next period for the price p Y . It follows that the first order condition (15) is changed as well:
Three results emerge 17 :
Theorem 4 If options are costless, i.e. χ = 0, the optimal amount of D t =
∞.
17 The proofs can be found in the appendix 4.1.
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This is probably the most straightforward result. Of course rational agents, being offered a free lunch, will happily accept this. Here the free lunch comes as a free lottery ticket, without any risk of loosing. We present this otherwise not very surprising result to make the structure of the decision problem more clear.
Theorem 5 If agents can choose between options and forwards at the same costs they will always choose options.
To facilitate the comparison between forwards and options we present the second result. It constitutes, again, a standard property of the utility function of the agents. Forwards will always be dominated by options, as long as the price is the same for both.
Corollary 6 For options and forward contracts to exist jointly forwards either have to cost less or be more than actuarially fair (or both).
To have in our world what we observe in reality, the joint existence of options together with forwards, necessitates the latter being cheaper than the former, a result that directly follows from above two theorems.
Theorem 7 If options are actuarially fair, i.e. E ¡ p
demand a positive amount of options, for a given positive cost of doing so χ.
Our last results highlights again the difference between forwards and options. In contrast to forward contracts there exist a positive demand, depending on the price χ, of "actuarially fair options", that is options that have a strike price that equals the expected value of the price in the next period.
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Conclusion
One largely debated issue in international economics is the question whether or not volatility in exchange rates and terms of trade depresses trade levels.
There is an extensive literature on that question, both theoretical and empirical. The main body of the theoretical literature claims that terms of trade and/or exchange rate uncertainty does not matter as long as well developed forward/futures markets exist. This literature further predicts that agents fully hedge the existing risks. The empirical work done in this field fails to unambiguously support these findings.
We model a small open economy that is subject to terms of trade risk completely stemming from abroad. We show that under this setup there is no demand for terms of trade insurance, a direct effect of the convexity of the indirect utility index with respect to prices. Risk aversion with respect to consumption levels and expenditure levels is not sufficient a motive to buy forwards. Further we derive the condition under which, on part of the risk averters, a positive demand for forwards will exist. In any world where different degrees of risk aversion up to risk neutrality jointly exists, there will be a positive demand for the kind of forwards which we modeled, for the agents with differing attitude towards risk would offer a more than actuarially fair insurance so that most risk averse agents would be willing to enter this contracts. The motive for the demand, however, will not be hedging but pure investment. We calibrate our model with data for Germany to obtain numerical solutions. The equilibrium amount of forwards contracted in relation to the equilibrium amount of imports closely resembles the empirical observed values, thus providing a rationale for the apparent underhedging of domestic agents against price level and/or exchange rate uncertainty. We then showed that options, as opposed to forwards, will be demanded as means of insurance. If prices are equal, options strictly dominate forward contracts.
This straightforward result may help explain why the market for options has grown exponentially over the last decade or so.
The main contribution of our analysis, however, is that the "price-convexity" effect should be incorporated in the existing models, which could be achieved by giving up the assumption that all plans are irrevocably made in the period which precedes the resolution of the uncertainty. This should alter dramatically the strong theoretical predictions of this literature with respect to forward markets and should thus provide a better understanding of the effects at work here. Since forwards are unattractive and options perhaps too expensive, our analysis may also provide an additional argument in favour of international capital flows, and hence capital account liberalization, as a means of insuring the economy.
Our work can be extended in some promising ways. First, to understand the implications of covariance effects so often at work in the hedging process money and thus a nominal exchange rate should be brought into the model. 
Together with the result
we know that there cannot be an interior solution with D > 0. Theorem 2: Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for suffi-
Proof of Theorem 2. For any interior solution we need the first order condition to be fulfilled. For that, at the point D = 0 we need
, i.e. the price risk neutral households would offer, risk averse agents will buy forward contracts. Proof of Theorem 3. The final result may be approached in a slightly different manner. Define a function ξ (c) which gives the sign of (23) at point D = 0. This function is simply given by
Surely, a price p Y for which there is an interior solution is then given by
Consider now risk neutral households. Their optimization problem will, in principle, be the same as treated above. In particular, since σ = 1 for risk neutrality, we have 19 This follows from the fact that in our case we have
Y .An application of Chebychevs second inequality brings the result that Cov Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952, pp. 43 and p.168) for reference.
20 See Appendix (6.2)
as the price for which there is an interior solution. Now differentiate ξ (c) with respect to c: Proof of Theorem 4. If we have χ = 0 we will always have
regardless of the choice of D. Since utility is increasing in consumption and consumption is increasing in D t it is optimal to demand an infinite amount.
Theorem 5: If agents can choose between options and forwards at the same cost they will always choose options.
Proof of Theorem 5. We prove this by contradiction. First note that for an interior solution to the optimal choice of D t we need to have the first order conditions fulfilled. If we substract (15) from (22), we arrive at the following expression
which cannot be true for the same set of parameters. This establishes that the two first order conditions cannot hold simultaneously. Moreover the above makes clear that
for the same set of parameters. It follows that
This together with concavity of utility in D t this is enough to establish the result. Theorem 7: If options are actuarially fair, i.e. E ¡ p Y t ¢ = p Y , agents will demand a positive amount of options, for a given positive cost of doing so χ.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof follows directly from (22) . The first integral enters negatively, the second positively. In general, there is a χ small enough to render the overall sum zero.
Concavity of expected utility with respect to D
In this section we give a short proof of the concavity of the indirect expected utility function with respect to the forwards.
Our first order condition, i.e. the first derivative of indirect expected utility with respect to D is given by:
The second derivative is then simply:
